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Abstract
A well informed and cautious ﬁnancial system can improves the
welfare outcome of an economy by driving lenders surplus to borrow-
ers. Nevertheless in a crisis situation the ﬁnancial system cautious
behavior can become a crisis ampliﬁer given that the credit approval
conditions are hardly meet, so there could be a credit crunch even
in a low interest rates environment. This paper illustrates the previ-
ous by developing a general equilibrium model where the collateral
credit condition deﬁnes the prudential behavior of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem. This and some other conditions amplify the magnitude of a
negative productivity shock.
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1 Introduction
Recent events in developed economies have called for special attention on the
ﬁnancial markets, reinforcing the idea that the developments in those have
marked the economic cycle and that a strong and sustained recovery must be
based on a solid ﬁnancial system. Nevertheless recovery has been slow and
highly expansive ﬁscal and monetary policies have done little to improve this.
Credit recovery has become one of the main concerns of the policy makers, as
expressed by the chairman of the Federal Reserve (FED) Ben S. Bernanke in
his declaration of June 7, 2012: The depressed housing market has also been
an important drag on the recovery. Despite historically low mortgage rates and
high levels of aﬀordability, many prospective home buyers cannot obtain mort-
gages, as lending standards have tightened and the creditworthiness of many
potential borrowers has been impaired. The behavior described in Bernanke's
declaration has no precedent in the last two decades, as shown in ﬁgure 1.
Bernanke's declaration summarizes most of this paper purpose, which is to
develop a theoretical model that shows how changes on the collateral constraint,
caused by both changes in the collateral's price and the bank's cautious behavior,
can strongly diminish the monetary policy eﬀectiveness by breaking the credit
channel.
This slump in household's credits has been one of the main reasons why
economic recovery has been slower than usual (similar references are found in
Miller and Stiglitz (2010), Diamond and Rajan (2009), Mishkin (2009), Taylor
(2009) and Brunnermeier (2008)). As shown in ﬁgure 21, US' unemployment
rate has never stayed over 7% for so long in the last two decades. This implies
a lower income for households and therefore lower consumption and welfare.
Nevertheless this type of comovements between the credit and economic
cycle are far from been new. Aliaga-Díaz and Pía (2010) (see also: Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ (2009), Bordo (2008) and Mendoza and Terrones (2008)) have found
evidence in line with this by proving a counter cyclical behavior of interest rates.
This implies that during crisis the credit is less accessible (due to higher interest
rates) reducing investment and worsens recessions.
This common behavior between the credit and economic cycle is closely
related to what the literature has referred as credit crunch and ﬁnancial
accelerator. These two terms are often used to explain the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial
system in economic crisis. Particularly, credit crunch refers to a signiﬁcant
reduction in the credit supply, and the ﬁnancial accelerator has been explained
as the ampliﬁcation of initial shocks due to changes in the credit market.
Bernanke and Lown (1991) mention a set of arguments that could explain the
credit crunch in the US 1990 crisis. Among many reasons oﬀered by the authors
"overzealous regulation" and the "credit demand and borrowers' balance sheets"
ﬁtted quite well to the events in the last six years (even though this two are not
chosen by the authors as the main factors for 1990's credit crunch). The ﬁrst
reason refers to a less lax behavior from banks during economic crisis in order to
1GDP cycle is obtained through a Hodrick Prescott ﬁlter whit a λ = 14400.
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Figure 1: Household's debt as% of the income and interest rates (monthly).
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reduce risky credit that could lead to loan losses. This kind of behavior directly
reduces credit. The second point argues that during crisis credit demand slows
down; one of many reasons for this is the weakening of borrower's balance sheet
which is aﬀected by lower prices. This last argument obtains more relevance
after the most recent crisis. As shown in ﬁgure 3 houses real prices have been
reducing constantly since the burst of the subprime crisis.
As shown by Arango et al. (2011) one of the reasons that could induce
an economic crisis after a price bubble burst is a protracted underpricing of
goods used as collateral, particularly land's prices. This phenomenon will reduce
collateral for a long period of time increasing the credit crunch length and
deepness.
Using some recent developments of the Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium (DSGE) literature on the housing market, this paper develops a DSGE
model that explains how ﬁnancial system's behavior can amplify negative eco-
nomic shocks in an expansive monetary environment and no mortgage delin-
quency, by increasing restrictions over credit.
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Figure 2: U. S. Unemployment and GDP cycle (monthly).
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1.1 Credit crunch and ﬁnancial accelerator
The credit crunch has usually been addressed as a consequence of economic
downturns instead of an economic ﬂuctuations sparker. One of the consequences
of a ﬁnancial system is larger ﬂuctuation due to the so called ﬁnancial accel-
erator. Bernanke's et al. (1996) seminal work refers to two complementary
characteristics of the ﬁnancial accelerator: the ampliﬁcation and propagation of
initial shocks. The main reason behind these two consequences is given by the
worsening of agent's ﬁnancial conditions. Particularly a ﬂight to quality reduces
the access to ﬁnancing of the most vulnerable agents in the economy restraining
their capacity to smooth consumption.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) illustrate some of the ﬁnancial accelerator ef-
fects by showing how Real Business Cycles (RBC) ﬂuctuations can reduce cash
ﬂows to borrowers and then, through investment, to the rest of the economy,
generating a vicious cycle that ampliﬁes the initial shock's eﬀect and prolongs
these to the following periods.
Similar conclusions are reached by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) in a model
4
Figure 3: Case-Shiller Home Price Indices and Household's debt as% of the
income (monthly).
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where ﬁrms can only operate with debt, causing that a ﬁrm whose access to
ﬁnancing is lowered reduces its production and proﬁts, and inducing an income
decline to the rest of the economy. Gertler (1992) and Aghion and Bolton (1997),
among other authors, ﬁnd the same eﬀects with diﬀerent models.
Bernanke et al. (1998) mention as a main reason of the ﬁnancial accelerator
the existence of information asymmetries as well as agency costs and the fact
that, under credit market's frictions, the borrowers ﬁnance premium depends
inversely on its wealth, reinforcing the conclusion that an exogenous reduction
of the household's income restrains the access to credit.
In line with Bernanke et al. (1998), Aoki et al. (2004) present a model with
frictions in the credit market that includes housing services in consumption.
They found that a positive shock in the economy increases demand for houses
and therefore their prices. This also improves houseowners' net worth, allowing
them to borrow more money, increasing the demand for houses even further.
In another perspective, Kiyotaki and Moore's (1997) seminal paper intro-
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duces a collateral constraint for borrowing, describing a diﬀerent mechanism of
crisis propagation trough credit. In this type of model crisis generates a lower-
ing in the price of any good used as collateral causing a reduction in borrowing
capacity and therefore lower spending.
The Kiyotaki and Moore's set up has been widely used in more recent papers
as Kocherlakota (2000), Monacelli (2009), Iacoviello (2005), Calza et al. (2009),
Brzoza-Brzezina and Makarski (2011) and Arango et al. (2011) among others.
This is due to the recent surge in the interest on the relation between credit and
the price of goods used as collateral. Most of these papers uses New Keynesian
DSGE models that illustrate how ﬁnancial system can amplify the initial eﬀect
of a productivity or monetary policy shock. Many of these models relay on a
Calvo pricing set up2 in order to simulate the eﬀect of durable goods' prices on
the collateral constraint.
Most of the literature after Kiyotaki and Moore's paper has taken the col-
lateral constrain as an exogenous term. Brzoza-Brzezina and Makarski (2011)
go further on this, presenting a DSGE model that introduces a credit constraint
that, in an exogenous way, becomes more restrictive causing a credit crunch.
Other works important to the development of this paper are referenced in
the above. Nevertheless the literature on credit-market is vast and the review
of the literature presented here is far from been a complete survey. Bernanke et
al. (1996) and (1998) can be referenced for further consulting.
1.2 The price bubble
Erroneous pricing is not an idea with which many economists fell comfortable,
nevertheless price bubbles are mostly about it. The last US crisis was an example
of this, as reported in some journals: We economists were wrong: Even when
traders in an asset market know the value of the asset, bubbles form dependably.
Bubbles can arise when some agents buy not on fundamental value, but on
price trend or momentum3.; Bubbles don't spring from nowhere. They're
usually tied to a development with far-reaching eﬀects: electricity and autos in
the 1920s, the Internet in the 1990s, the growth of China and India. At the
outset, a surge in the values of related businesses and goods is often justiﬁed.
But then it detaches from reality4. What this section is trying to say is that
prices bubbles usually only look like irrational behavior after they burst, in the
mean time between the climbing and peak of prices it looks like a sustainable
situation. In words of the former chairman of the FOMC, Alan Greenspan: "this
vast increase in the market value of asset claims is in part the indirect result
of investors accepting lower compensation for risk. Such an increase in market
value is too often viewed by market participants as structural and permanent"5.
The mentioned pricing behavior lead to larger consequences that extended
to all the economy; as stated by some analysts, the burst of home price's bubble
2Calvo (1983).
3Steven Gjerstad and Vernon L. Smith. April 6, 2009 at The Wall Street Journal.
4Justin Lahart, May 16, 2008 at The Wall Street Journal.
5As wrote by Paul Krugman, August 29, 2005 at The New York Times.
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play a crucial role in the economy's crash: In the absence of home-price ap-
preciation, many households are ﬁnding it diﬃcult to reﬁnance their way out of
adjustable-rate mortgages obtained at the height of the housing boom. Larger
mortgage payments could exacerbate delinquencies and foreclosures, especially
with interest rate resets expected to remain high for the next year6.; Some of
this trouble might have been avoided if home prices had continued to climb like
they did between 2000 and 2005. As a home appreciates, even borrowers who
aren't paying the principal loan amount build up more equity. That in turn
would have made it easier for subprime borrowers to reﬁnance into yet another
loan with a low interest rate7. This two statements reﬂect the main idea of
this paper as it only focus on the burst of the price bubble8.
1.3 Financial system's cautious behavior
Financial system usually take many cautions as payment aﬀordability and credit
score among others. Yet the only one that remains useful after default is the
collateral. The sole action of asking for collateral can be seen as caution behav-
ior; however this is usually not enough. Under Kiyotaki and Moore's approach
only one percentage of the asset can be used as collateral (usually 75%), this
proportion is constant and therefore makes it harder to recreate the ﬁnancial
system tighten behavior. Since all these situation are cautious behavior at dif-
ferent degree, for simplicity of this paper taking collateral at some percentage
will be called cautious behavior9.
My paper presents a model where the collateral constraint, diﬀerent to pre-
vious literature, is endogenous and describes the ﬁnancial system's decisions,
which, along with a naive pricing scheme as proposed in Arango et al (2011),
generates an amplifying eﬀect like the one described by the ﬁnancial accelerator
literature. But, unlike most of the conventional wisdom, the ﬁnancial accelerator
is not driven by the interest rate. As a consequence this paper's contribution is
to simulate a credit crunch in a low interest rates environment so that monetary
policy has no signiﬁcant eﬀect
After this brief introduction four more sections complete this paper: section
two present the DSGE model; section three present the parameters calibration;
section four shows some simulations results; section ﬁve concludes.
2 The model
The economy described in the model is conformed by representative households
that consume durable and non durable goods. They obtain their income from
several sources that can be divide in three groups: productive factors, beneﬁts
6DiMartino and Duca (2007).
7The Associated Press. March 13, 2007 at NBC News.
8A description of the boom and consequent burst in a price bubble can be found in Arango
et all (2011).
9Lower percentages will imply a less lax behavior.
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Figure 4: model.
and credits. There are three types of productive factors: labor, capital and
land; all of them are used by ﬁrms, owned by the households, that produce
an intermediate good that is later used by other kind of ﬁrms to produce the
ﬁnal goods consumed by the households. The intermediate ﬁrms are slightly
diﬀerentiated and produce beneﬁts that are delivered to the owners.
Credits have to be paid one period after acquired with an interest rate set
by the monetary authority; therefore the monetary authority provides all the
liquidity needed to sustain the Taylor rule based interest rate. The credit is
provided through the ﬁnancial system that works under perfect competition
having no markup on the interest rate. Nevertheless ﬁnancial system demands
a collateral for lending. This collateral constraint is determined by the land's
price which is equivalent to the present value of future land's rents. This closes
the production and credit circle that is summarized in ﬁgure 4.
2.1 Households
A typical household is described by inﬁnitive lifetime utility horizon given by:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtU (xt, nt)
}
(1)
Where nt is the total hours worked by borrowers and xt is the consumption
index which is a bundle of non durable (ct) and durable (dt) consumption,
described by:
xt =
[
(1− αh)
1
νc (ct)
νc−1
νc + (αh)
1
νc (dt)
νc−1
νc
] νc
νc−1
(2)
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Also it will be assumed that utility is a constant relative risk aversion function
described by:
U (xt, nt) =
(xt)
1−σ
1− σ − ϕ
l1+µt
1 + µ
(3)
Household's decisions are subject, at any time, to an intertemporal budget
constrain that, expressed in units of the non durable good, is:
wtlt + r
k
t kt + pt + bt + r
L
t L¯+ (1− δh) qtdt−1 + (1− δk) kt−1 ≥
(1 + rt) bt−1 + ct + dtqt + kt (4)
Where at every period t: wt is the salary, r
k
t the capital's rent, kt the capital, pt
intermediate ﬁrms beneﬁts, L¯ y rLt the land and it's rent, bt the debt acquired
every period, rt the interest rate
10, δh and δk the durable goods and capital's
depreciation rate, qt durable goods price. Finally pi
c
t is the change in the price
of the consumption good; given that every variable is expressed in terms of the
consumption good, pict is the measure of inﬂation.
Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Household's borrowing decision is
also constrained to it's collateral endowment, this is:
bt (1 + rt) ≤ χtEt (ζt) (5)
where Et (ζt) is the expected value of land and χt is the proportion of land's
value that can be used as collateral; further explanation on this variable will be
given in the following11.
Given that land is a productive factor it's value is determined by the present
value of future productivity:
Et (ζt) =
∞∑
h=0
βhEt
(
rLt+hL¯
)
(6)
Following closely Arango et al (2011), land's value is set on a naive12 way,
in which lands value depends on the present value of future land's revenue, this
is13:
Et (ζt) =
∞∑
h=0
Et
(
βhrLt L¯
)
= rLt L¯
1
1− β (7)
Equation (7) assumes that transitory productivity shocks are seen by the market
as permanent, this is in line with the behavior described in section 1.2. Never-
theless, as the shocks disappears, equation (7) implies that land prices return
to its unchanged steady state.
101 + rt =
1+it
1+pic
t
11As in Monacelli (2009), collateral constrain saturates in the proximity of the steady state,
making equation (5) an equality.
12The naive pricing scheme proposed by the authors supposes that, at any moment, market's
land valuation is done assuming that future land's revenues would stay unchanged in the future
(rLt = r
L
t+1 = r
L
t+2 = ...) as if the present is the steady state.
13Given that 0 < β < 1 expresion
∑∞
h=0
βh is equal to 1
1−β .
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Households decisions on consumption of both types, labor, capital and bor-
rowing are:
λt = (xt)
−σ
x
1
ν
t (1− α) (ct)
−1
ν (8)
0 = (xt)
−σ
x
1
ν
t (α)
1
ν (dt)
− 1ν + λt+1β (1− δh) qt+1 − λtqt (9)
ϕlµt = λtwt (10)
λt = λtr
k
t + λt+1β (1− δk) (11)
βλt+1 (1 + rt+1) = λt + λtγt (1 + rt) (12)
Where λt is the shadow price of real income that, as shown in equation (8),
is equivalent to the marginal utility of no durable consumption.
2.2 Final good producers
Final good producers transform the intermediate good (yjt) in both durable
and no durable good (yit = ct, dt), using the same technology described by the
following bounder: [ˆ 1
0
y
θ−1
θ
jt dj
] θ
θ−1
= yit for i = d, c (13)
Those ﬁrms minimize their cost determined by the input price (pit) sub-
ject to equation (13). The standard cost minimization implies the following
intermediate good demand:
yjt =
(
pjt
Pt
)−θ
yit (14)
Where Pt is the aggregated price level given by:
Pt =
[(
(1− ω) (pjt)1−θ + (ω) (Pt−1)1−θ
)] 1
1−θ
(15)
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2.3 Intermediate good ﬁrms
A typical ﬁrm j operates a Cobb-Douglas production function given by:
yj,t = ztk
1−α−ν
j,t n
α
j,tL¯
ν
j (16)
Where zt = z
ρz
t−1z
1−ρzeε
z
t describes the technology process which depends
on a normal distributed shock.
Firms minimize their cost subject to their production function, this is:
min
ljt, kjt
wtlj,t + r
k
t kj,t + r
L
t L¯j − ηjt
(
yj,t − ztk1−α−νj,t nαj,tL¯νj
)
(17)
Where ηjt is the intermediate good production's marginal cost.
First order condition attaining capital, land and labor are:
rkt = ηjt (1− α− ν)
yj,t
kj,t
(18)
wt = ηjtα
yj,t
lj,t
(19)
rLt = ηjtν
yj,t
L¯j
(20)
2.3.1 Intermediate goods pricing
Intermediate goods ﬁrms also select their prices following a Calvo pricing re-
striction. This means that, at any period t, only a proportion 1 − ω of the
ﬁrms can adjust their prices. Price setting is determined by the following proﬁt
maximization problem.
max
pjt
Πt =
∞∑
i=0
(βω)
i
((
pjt
Pt+i
)
− ηjt+i
)
yjt+i (21)
The solution to this optimization problem is:
pjt
Pt
=
θ
θ − 1

∑∞
i=0 (βω)
i
ηjt+i
(
Pt+i
Pt
)θ
yt+i∑∞
i=0 (βω)
i
(
Pt+i
Pt
)θ−1
yt+i
 (22)
Equation (22) is the ﬁrm's j relative price that, along with (15), summarizes
the solution to (21).
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2.4 Financial system
Financial system is under perfect competition, which means that no beneﬁt
is obtained from its activities. Nevertheless, in order to stay in the market,
ﬁnancial institutions must take measures that allow them to have a safe lending
activity. This means that collateral must be enough to cover the debt at any
time, situation that is particularly diﬃcult to attain when the collateral prices
are in a downward dynamic. From now on the condition that enables a complete
collateral coverage of the debt's value will be referred as safe lending condition
(SLC). It implies that at any time:
(1 + rt) bt−1 ≤ ζt (23)
As said before, this type of condition is overruled by equation (5) during
positive ﬂuctuations, since land's price will be always larger and hence enough
to cover the debt and it's cost.
The collateral value can be expressed at any time as a function of it's dy-
namics:
ζt = κtζ (24)
where
κt ∈ (0,∞) (25)
As mentioned before, ﬁnancial system's problem arises when land's value is
below debt's total value, this is:
(1 + rt) bt−1
ζt
> 1 (26)
Using (24), equation (26) can be expressed as:
(1 + rt) bt−1
ζ
> κt (27)
The SLC problem is that credit's approval is given one period before it's
payment, making it impossible to know the collateral coverage over the debt if
defaulted, when credit conditions are established. In this order we have that, if
credit is approved in t, SLC is:
(Et [1 + rt+1]) bt ≤ Et [ζt+1]
or (28)
(Et [1 + rt+1]) bt ≤ Et [κt+1] ζ
Assuming one more time naive pricing, this is:
(1 + rt) bt ≤ κtζ
(1 + rt) bt
ζt
≤ κt (29)
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A similar condition is found in (5), where χt can be read as a variable that
undervalues current land's price in order to guarantee a complete coverage of
debt's in the next period. Following this interpretation SLC can be expressed
as a condition on χt. Using equation (5) and (29) we have that a suﬃcient
condition for SLC is:
χt ≤ κt (30)
or
χt ≤ ζt
ζ
(31)
Following the later and using κt as χt's argument, χt must ﬁt the following
conditions
χt =

1.
2.
3.
f (κt) ∈ (0, 1) ∀κt ∈ (0,∞)
f (κt) = 0 ⇐⇒ κt = 0
f (κt) ≤ κt ∀κt ∈ (0,∞)
(32)
First condition constrains equation (5) to the literature standards of χt be-
tween 0 and 1 given that κt can only take positive values; second condition
keeps credit to zero when there is no value in the collateral and third condition
allows for equation (31) to be met.
The speciﬁc equation with these conditions is the following:
χ (κt) =
(
eκt−ϑ
1 + eκt−ϑ
− Φ
)
(1− Φ)−1 (33)
Where ϑ and Φ are chosen to ﬁt conditions (32) as shown in ﬁgure 5.
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Figure 5: mapping of χ (κt).
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2.5 Monetary policy
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule determined by the consumption
goods inﬂation, described by:
rt = r¯
(
pict
p¯i
)ϕ(
yt−n
y¯
)(1−ϕ)
(34)
Where ϕ determines the weight of inﬂation in the dual objective interest
rate rule.
3 Calibration
Calibration of the model is done following some literature standards. Most of
the works used for this are built to reply some developed economies, mainly the
US economy. This paper is intended to illustrate the transmission mechanism
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through which the ﬁnancial system can amplify negative economic shocks in a
low interest rates environment. So as prediction power is not an issue a non
controversial calibration, like the one presented in this section, serves well this
paper's purpose.
Among some works Faia and Monacelli (2007) and Monacelli (2009) are
closely follow in choosing the parameters value. Some other papers are men-
tioned in Table 1.
Households discount factor β is set equal to 0.99 which means that the dis-
count rate is 0.03 in a quarterly basis. Labor and land's share in the production
function are are in that order α = 0.33 and ν = 0.16. Capital's an durable
good's depreciation factor (δk and δh) are both equal to 0.025.
Elasticity of substitution among productive sectors is given by θ = 6. Elas-
ticity of substitution between durable and non durable goods (νc) is set to 1.4.
Durable goods' share in the consumption bounder is αh = 0.27. The chance of
price adjustment ω = 0.75, implies that price adjustment occurs every 4 quar-
ters 14. Consumption and labor weights' in the utility function are given by
σ = 1 and µ = 1. Finally it is assumed that only 75% of the land can be used
as collateral (χ = 0.25)
As mentioned before ϑ and Φ are chosen to ﬁt conditions (32), this is ϑ = 1.93
and Φ = 0.87. All other parameters that are taken from the literature are
summaraised in Table 1.
4 Results
This section presents the model's results under two diﬀerent conditions: ﬁxed
and variable χt. The ﬁrst case describes a collateral constrain very similar to
the one in Kiyotaki and Moore, where the proportion of land's value that can
be used as collateral is always constant (I will refer to this case as ﬁxed). In
this case χt = χ, using (5) this is:
bt (1 + rt) ≤ χEt (ζt)
The second case is the one described in (5) where a downward trend on land's
value increases ﬁnancial system's awareness and so reduces the credit slackness,
as described by equation(33), reducing households' access to new credits at any
interest rate (I will refer to this case as variable).
Figures 6 and 7 show the response of diﬀerent variables to a shock in tech-
nology given by a 1% decrease in εzt in period t = 0.
Figure 6 shows that a 1% negative shock in technology cause an even larger
reduction in production due to the so call ﬁnancial accelerator, as reﬂected in
the borrowing's dynamics (ﬁgure 7).
From the demands point of view, the negative shock reduces land's produc-
tivity causing an even larger reduction in its value due to the naive pricing
assumption. This strongly restrains credit extending the reduction eﬀects to
14 1
1−ω = 4
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durable consumption and capital investment. Particularly capital show a very
pronounced decrease highly linked to the durable goods dynamics that, opposite
to the non durable goods, shows an increase after the production shock. Both
capital and non durable goods are instrument that allow households to trans-
fer wealth from one period to the other. Nevertheless, diﬀerent to the capital
behavior, durable goods proﬁtability is never aﬀected by the technology shock,
making that households substitute capital with durable goods. From the supply
point of view the negative εzt shock reduces all productive factors rent, shrinking
the household's supply of all of them, specially of capital as said before. This
clearly reduces production and ergo consumption and investment.
As mentioned before, ﬁgures 6 and 7 show the eﬀects whit a ﬁxed χ and
varible χt described in equation (33). Both ﬁgures show that SLC induces
and even deeper ﬂuctuation, particularly on the credits dynamics. However
production decrease during the ﬁrst period, is only 1.075 times bigger that
under variable χt, this diﬀerence diminishes during the following periods. The
fact that this situation is common to all the variables, allows concluding that
most of the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect simulated by the model is explained by
the collateral value and no so much by the ﬁnancial system's cautious behavior.
A similar remark is found in Bernanke et al (1991), where they ﬁnd no evidence
that ﬁnancial system's cautious behavior, which they address as overzealous
regulation has a signiﬁcant impact on lending. On the other hand borrowers'
balance sheets, strongly determined by collateral's value, is found to be a valid
answer to the weakening of lending activity.
Unlike conventional wisdom, in both cases depicted in ﬁgures 6 and 7, the
production, credit and other variables, slowdown despites of the low interest
rates. The main reason for the credit and economy's slowdown is found in the
limited access to lending at a low interest rate like ones set by the monetary
authority 15. So it is the shortage on warranties oﬀered by the borrowers that
explains most of the credit's slump.
15A low interest rate rules out a ﬂight to quality or any shortage of ﬁnancial system's
liquidity.
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Figure 6: Impulse response to a 1% decrease in εzt under naive expectations
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Figure 7: Impulse response to a 1% decrease in εzt under naive expectations
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4.1 Alternative monetary policy
Simulations in ﬁgure 8 and 9 show the eﬀect of an interest rate rule diﬀerent to
(34). This alternative rule uses a bounder of land's prices and the price index
of consumption goods, this is:
it = i¯
(
(1− υ) pi
c
t
pi
+ υ
ζt
ζ
)ϕ(
yt
y¯
)1−ϕ
(35)
where υ is the weight of land's value in the prices index factor.
As shown in ﬁgures 6 and 7, land's value is one of the variables that has the
strongest reaction after the initial shock. Using (35) causes a greater decrease
in interest rates for higher values of υ. A more expansive monetary policy
should reduces the economy's slump, but, as shown in ﬁgures 8 and 9, a more
restrictive credit constrain, explained by the collateral value and the ﬁnancial
system behavior16, can stop the monetary policy expansion's eﬀects. Figures 8
and 9 map respectively the impulse response of product and interest for diﬀerent
values of υ. Figures 10 and 11 shows that higher values of υ increase the
monetary authority reaction to the production shock, through lower interest
rates. This eﬀect is hard to acknowledge in ﬁgures 8 and 9, which unveils some
monetary policy impotence during economic crisis. This is a consequence of the
16Simulations are done using (5).
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Figure 8: Product response with υ = 0 and υ = 0.5, to a 1% decrease in εzt
under naive expectations
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strong reaction on the collateral that prevents the credit recovery despite the
low interest rates.
4.2 Alternative land's valuation scheme
Pricing as proposed in equation (7) creates a very strong reaction after a pro-
ductivity shock, allowing to simulate the dynamics of a price bubble's burst,
as shown in Figures 6 to 11 for the land's value. Even if the results are quite
compelling it is interesting to try a diﬀerent way to determine the land's value
in order to prove the exercises robustness .
An alternative pricing scheme must be based on a diﬀerent expectations
formation model; one alternative is having adaptive expectations. Following
Nerlove and Bessler (2001) one can suppose that at every time t the expected
land's revenue is the steady state value plus a portion of the deviation from the
steady state observed in the last period, this is:
Et
(
rLt+1
)
= rL + Ω
(
rLt − rL
)
for 0 < Ω < 1 (36)
Iterating and replacing (36) in (6), follows that:
Et (ζt) = L¯
[
rL
(
β
1− β
)
+ rLt +
(
rLt − rL
)( βΩ
1− βΩ
)]
(37)
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Figure 9: Product response with diﬀerent values of υ, to a 1% decrease in εzt
under naive expectations
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Figure 10: Interest rate (as in (35)) response with υ = 0 and υ = 0.5, to a 1%
decrease in εzt under naive expectations
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Figure 11: Interest rate (as in (35)) response with diﬀerent values of υ, to a 1%
decrease in εzt under naive expectations
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As the reader can notice, equation (7) and (37) are similar in the fact that
both depend on the present productivity of land; the diﬀerence is that (37)
assumes that only a fraction of the present productivity is incorporated in the
land's price. It also can be demonstrated that these equations are equivalent in
steady state17.
Results for this alternative expectations formation model are quite similar
to the naive pricing scheme, as shown in Figures 12 and 1318. Nevertheless the
price bubble burst depicted in Figure 13 is not as strong as the one in ﬁgure 7;
this as a consequence of higher transitory information asymmetries in the naive
expectations compared to the one with adaptive expectations.
Pricing schemes purposed in equations (7) and (37) are a result of non ratio-
nal expectations. Given that under rational expectation there is by deﬁnition
non wrong pricing, there is no place for a bubble burst. This is why a wrong
pricing scheme, like the one in equations (7) and (37), is needed in order to
illustrate a bubble's burst.
Figure 12: Impulse response to a 1% decrease in εzt under adaptive expectations
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17In steady state:
Equation (7) is:
∑∞
h=0
βhrLt L¯ = r
L
t L¯+ βr
L
t L¯+ β
2rLt L¯+ ... = r
L
t L¯
1
1−β .
Equation (37) is: L¯
[
rL
(
β
1−β
)
+ rLt
]
= rLt L¯+ βr
L
t L¯+ β
2rLt L¯+ ...
18All the other variables have a very similar behavior to the one in ﬁgures 6 and 7.
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Figure 13: Impulse response to a 1% decrease in εzt under adaptive expectations
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5 Conclusions
The model depicts an amplifying eﬀect of credit over the rest of the economy,
which is vastly described by the ﬁnancial accelerator literature. Nevertheless,
unlike most of the literature, credit's dynamic is determined by the collateral
meaning that collateral value and ﬁnancial system's slackness, when taking guar-
anties for credit approvals, can determine credit's dynamic, playing a more im-
portant role the ﬁrst factor than the second.
Under this circumstance traditional monetary policy proves highly ineﬃcient
in increasing economic activity, keeping the economy in a sort of liquidity
trap induced by the low access to credit. As collateral determines the credit's
value, asset's price used for this restriction deserve special attention of economic
authorities in order to have a higher control on the credit cycle and its power
to inﬂuence the economic cycle.
The simulations shows that the collaterals value can become a strong barrier
to expansive monetary policy given that credit approvals need two conditions:
asking for it and being worthy. Low interest rates can make it for the ﬁrst
condition but not for the second. For that reason lowering interest rates in
order to improve credit and thus house price might not be enough.
This kind of situation showed that the burst of a price bubble on assets
used as collateral have larger consequences that lets say the .com bubble. It
is also harder to deal with given that monetary policy eﬀectiveness diminishes.
25
This makes that the idea of buying houses and burn them in order to reduce
supply does not look so unappealing, notwithstanding it is steel unviable. Some
central banks have tried buying unusual assets (for instance the Bank of Japan
has started to intervene in the stock market and the FEDS' QE programs have
also lead to unusual balance sheets); nevertheless these actions have been quite
futile given that those assets are not used as collateral.
Intervention of monetary authorities in the real estate market can be more
distortionary than useful, that's why the attention must be in avoiding price
bubbles, at least on asset that usually are used as collateral. In those cases
the Greenspan's philosophy of not doing anything and then cleaning the mess19
might not be the best idea.
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